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Villemez: Evidence - Constitutional Law - The Confrontation Clause and the
EVIDENCE-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-The Confrontation Clause and the
Catch-all Exception to the Hearsay Doctrine. Hopkinson v. State, 632
P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981).

In the early morning hours of Sunday, August 7, 1977,
a bomb in the home of attorney Vincent Vehar exploded,
killing him, his wife and son while they slept.' Almost two
years later, and two days before the scheduled opening of
the grand jury's investigation into the Vehar bombing, Jeff
Green's tortured and mutilated body was discovered near
a rest stop on Interstate Highway 80.2 Following a grand
jury investigation, Mark Hopkinson was charged with firstdegree murder in all four of these deaths.' Hopkinson and
Vehar had been adversaries in two civil cases, and Hopkinson was Green's employer.4
At trial, the state called thirty-seven witnesses to the
stand, including Green's former attorney.' The prosecutor
and the attorney read into the record portions of Green's
testimony at an earlier trial in which one Hysell was charged
with murder.' Green's testimony implicated Hopkinson in
a plan to murder Vehar and established Green's fear of
Hopkinson.' Hopkinson was not a defendant in the Hysell
trial and, of course, did not cross-examine Green.
Green's sister was also a witness for the state.' She
testified that Green had told her of threats Hopkinson had
made to Green and of Hopkinson's hatred for Vehar.9 Four
witnesses testified as to statements Vehar had made in
which he had expressed fear for his safety because of
threats from Hopkinson.'1 Hopkinson was convicted on four
counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for
the Green murder and life imprisonment for the Vehar
killings.1
Copyright@ 1982 by the University of Wyoming

1. Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 95 (Wyo. 1981) [hereinafter cited in text
as Hopkinson].
2. Id. at 96-97. Brief for Appellee at 10, Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79
(Wyo. 1981).

3.
4.
5.
6.

Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 97.
Id. at 93-94.
Brief for Appellant at 4-8, Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo, 1981).
Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 134, 135.

7. Id. at 95, 134.

8.
9.
10.
11.

Brief for Appellent, supra note 5, at 7.
Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 136.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 97.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1982

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 17 [1982], Iss. 2, Art. 13

704

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVII

On appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court, Hopkinson
challenged the out-of-court statements of Green and Vehar

as inadmissible hearsay. 2 The court held the statements to
be admissible under the catch-all exception to the hearsay
doctrine, Rule 804(b) (6) of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence.'

Further, the court held that admission of the state-

ments did not infringe upon Hopkinson's right to confront
witnesses against him as guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-

ment to the United States Constitution 4 and Article I,
Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution. 5 Since the court
had never before interpreted Rule 804(b) (6)," it an-

nounced as its purpose the establishment of "a test which
[would] be applied in ad hoc fashion and [would] exclude
all evidence either barred by the hearsay rule or the Confrontation Clause, or both."" The court then developed and
applied a six-part test in determining that the hearsay
statements of the victims were properly admitted. 8
This note will examine the major United States Su-

preme Court decisions which have interpreted the Confrontation Clause and comment on current theories of the
clause derived therefrom. The history and purpose of Rule
804(b) (6) will be examined briefly, and several circuit
court decisions which have analyzed the rule as it relates
to the Sixth Amendment will be reviewed. Finally, the note
will show that the Hopkinson test, while providing guidance
for Rule 804(b) (6) application, departs from the funda12. Id. at 127-28. Appellant raised nineteen issues on appeal, including the hearsay issue. Id. at 92. Rule 802 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence provides,
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other
rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Wyoming or by statute." Rule 801
(c) of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence defines hearsay: "'Hearsay' is a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."
13. Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 133-36.
14. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .. ."
15. Article I, Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution states: "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to be confronted with
H."
lopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 132the witnesses against him ...
36.
16. Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 130.
17. Id. at 132.
18. Id. at 130-36.
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mental requirements of the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

The United States Supreme Court Decisions
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses

against him."1 The Supreme Court first had occasion to
consider the Confrontation Clause in 18950 in Mattox v.
United States.2 Mattox was tried twice for the crime of
murder. At his second trial, transcripts of the testimony
of two witnesses, who had been fully cross examined under
oath at the first trial but had since died, were introduced
into evidence. 2 In holding the transcripts to be admissible,
the Court stated in an oft-quoted passage:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or
ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes
admitted in civil cases, being used against the
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness in which the
accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face
with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeaner upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives his testimony whether
he is worthy of belief.2 "
Even though these safeguards provided by the physical
presence of a witness are essential to any trial, the Court
determined that such protections "must occasionally give
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities
of the case." 24 The modern era of Confrontation Clause
19. See generally 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 418 (1980).
20. Note, The Right to Confrontation: One Step Beyond Bruton, 56 NEB. L.
REV. 936 (1977).
21. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
22. Id. at 240.
23. Id. at 242-43.
24. Id. at 243.
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analysis began in 1965" with Pointer v. Texas,26 a case in
which the Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment right
of confrontation to be a "fundamental right," applicable to
7
the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. The prosecution in Pointer had offered into evidence a transcript of
the victim's testimony given at the preliminary hearing in
which Pointer had not been represented by counsel. The
8
victim had left the state and was unavailable at trial.
Since in the absence of counsel Pointer had not had a complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine the victim
at the hearing, the Court held the Sixth Amendment barred
admission of the transcript."
Three years later in Barber v. Page, the Court found
the Confrontation Clause to bar admission of a preliminary
hearing transcript where the declarant was incarcerated
out of state and the State had made no effort to obtain
him for trial." "The right to confrontation is basically a
trial right," the Court declared. "It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to
weigh the demeanor of the witness." 1
The absence of opportunity to cross-examine the deStates,3 2
clarant was again crucial in Bruton v. United
where the defendant and one Evans were tried together
for armed postal robbery. A postal inspector was permitted
3
to testify as to an oral confession made to him by Evans.
The Court determined that the confession added substantial
support to the government's case 4 against both defendants,
even though the trial judge had instructed the jury to dis3
regard the confession as far as Bruton was concerned.
The authors
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 19, at 133-50.
identify nine major decisions handed down by the United States Supreme
Court since 1965. These decisions include, in addition to those discussed in
the text, Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), and Nelson v. O'Neil,
402 U.S. 622 (1971). Id.
380 U.S. 400 (1965) [hereinafter cited in text as Pointer].
Id. at 403.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 407.
390 U.S. 719 (1968) [hereinafter cited in text as Barber].
Id. at 725.
391 U.S. 123 (1968).
Id. at 124.
Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 125.

25. 4 D.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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Since Evans himself did not testify, the content of the confession was not subject to cross-examination, and Bruton's
right to confront witnesses against him was denied. 8
The next major case was California v. Green, decided
in 1970." ' At issue were two separate pieces of evidencethe preliminary hearing testimony of one Porter that Green
was his marijuana supplier, and Porter's similar but unsworn statement to Police Officer Wade. At the preliminary
hearing, Green's attorney subjected Porter to extensive
cross-examination. At trial, however, Porter claimed inability to remember any of the transactions to which he
had testified, which prompted the prosecutor to read portions of his earlier testimony to "refresh his memory." 8
The Court found that Porter's preliminary hearing statement had been given under safeguards typically associated
with a trial, and unlike Barber, the State had produced
the witness. Therefore, admission of the preliminary hearing transcript did not violate the Confrontation Clause."
The admissibility of Porter's statement to Police Officer
Wade, which had never been tested by cross-examination,
was a different matter. The Court remanded the case to
determine whether Porter's inability to remember the underlying transactions so affected Green's right to cross-examine
that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation." It appears that the opportunity to meaningfully cross-examine the declarant and not the reliability of
Police Officer Wade's statement, was essential to avoid
offending the Confrontation Clause.
Dutton v. Evans, a four-one-four decision handed down
shortly after Green, represents an anomaly in this line of
Confrontation Clause cases. 1 In Evans, the prosecution had
a "solid" case which included the eye-witness testimony of
an alleged accomplice who described in detail the killing of
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 128.
399 U.S. 149 (1970).
Id. at 151-52.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 168-69.
400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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three police officers and Evans' participation on that killing.
The State called nineteen other witnesses, one of whom was
a man named Shaw. Shaw testified that a fellow inmate,
upon returning to the penitentiary after arraignment on
charges of murdering the police officers, had made the
statement, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch
Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now."42 The admissibility
of this single sentence was challenged on appeal.
First, the plurality decided that Shaw's testimony was
not in any sense "crucial" to the state's case or "devastating" to the defendant. Shaw's testimony was characterized
as "of peripheral significance at most."4 The Court determined that Evans' right of confrontation was not abridged
and bolstered its conclusion by listing five "indicia of reliability" inherent in the inmate's out-of-court statement.44
This decision may be characterized as an anomaly because
no reference was made to the availability of the declarant,"
and only passing attention was paid to the defendant's lack
of opportunity to cross-examine.4" Instead, the decision rests
on a finding that the hearsay was not crucial to the prosecution and was reliable.
In Mancusi v. Stubbs, the availability of the declarant
was again the focal point of the decision." In 1954, Stubbs
had been convicted of murder and kidnapping, primarily
as a result of the testimony of one of the kidnapping victims.
Ten years later he was awarded a retrial on the ground
that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel.
The victim's earlier testimony was read into the record,
since he had moved out of the country.,' Stubbs argued
42. Id. at 77.
43. Id. at 87.
44. Id. at 88-89. The five "indicia of reliability" found by the plurality were
(1) the statement contained no assertion about a past fact, (2) the declarant's participation in the murder was established by other evidence, (3)
no real possibility of faulty recollection existed, (4) the declarant's statement was spontaneous and (5) against penal interest. Id.
45. Justice Marshall in a dissenting opinion stated that the declarant was
available to the state and may well have been a willing witness. Id. at 102.
46. The plurality found the possibility unreal that cross-examination could have
shown the declarant's statement to be unreliable. Id. at 89.
47. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
48. Id. at 207-09. The finding of ineffective counsel was based on the fact that
counsel had been appointed only four days before trial. Id. at 209.
49. Id. at 209.
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that introduction of the prior testimony deprived him of
his confrontation right for two reasons: (1) the State did
not make a reasonable effort to produce the witness,"
and (2) he was denied an adequate opportunity for crossexamination at the previous trial by reason of ineffective
counsel. 1
The Court found the witness to be unavailable for
purposes of the Confrontation Clause, since the State was
powerless to compel the appearance of one residing in a
foreign country.2 Before the Court was willing to say that
Stubb's right to confront witnesses had not been denied, it
considered the adequacy of the cross-examination at the
first trial. The Court found the 1954 proceeding to be a
trial of a serious felony on the merits in which Stubbs was
represented by counsel who conducted effective cross-examination of the witnesses. 3 Consequently, it was held that
Stubb's rights under the Confrontation Clause were preserved.
Ohio v. Roberts represents the Supreme Court's most
recent pronouncement on the Confrontation Clause. 4 This
case involved the admission into evidence of the prior preliminary hearing testimony of an unlocated witness. The
witness had been a defense witness whose testimony had
been unhelpful to the defendant. The defense attorney, had
not asked to have the witness declared hostile nor had he
requested permission to cross-examine her at the preliminary hearing."
The Court held that the state had done all that was
necessary to produce the witness when it sent five subpoenas to her last known address. 6 The Court then went on
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 211.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 213-14. The Court found cross-examination to have been adequate in
the first trial for three reasons: (1) the habeas judge based his reversal
decision on a per se rule of ineffective counsel; (2) the Tennessee Supreme
Court expressly determined when Stubbs appealed his 1964 conviction that
cross-examination in the 1954 trial had been adequate; and (3) counsel at
retrial did not suggest any material line of cross-examination that was not,
to some extent, advanced:in the first trial. Id. at 213-15.
54. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
55. Id. at 58.
56. Id. at 59-60, 75.
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to equate, for the first time, the Confrontation Clause with
evidentiary rules:
[Where there is a showing that a witness is unavailable,] his statement is admissible only if it
bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability
can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness."
What Do the Decisions Mean?
Most commentators agree that the Supreme Court
cases present no clear and comprehensive theory of the
Confrontation Clause upon which the lower courts can rely
for guidance. 8 One suggested rule for applying the confrontation doctrine focuses on the impact of the evidence
against the accused and the availability of the witness to
testify at trialY9 Under this theory, a court faced with a
confrontation issue must ask two questions: (1) Was the
challenged statement made by a "witness against" the
accused? (2) If so, do circumstances exist which excuse
an absence of cross-examination of this witness at trial?
This theory starts with the premise that, absent waiver
or excusing circumstances, the Sixth Amendment requires a
witness against the defendant to be present at trial, under
oath and subject to full and effective cross-examination."
57. Id. at 66.
58. 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 19, at 133; Graham, The Right
of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another
One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 125 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Graham, The
Right of Confrontation];Western, Confrontation and Compulsory Process:
A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARv. L. REV. 567,
568 (1978) ; Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the
Forgetful Witness, 56 TEX. L. REV. 151, 183 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Graham, The Confrontation Clause]; Baker, The Right to Confrontation,
The Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A Proposal for Determining When
Hearsay May be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529, 532 (1974).
59. Graham, The Right of Confrontation, supra note 58, at 128, 138-40. For an
expanded variation of this theory, see 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra
note 19, at 150-67.
60. Graham, The Right of Confrontation, supra note 58, at 134-35. Graham
elaborates upon this premise as follows:
One might argue that just as some of the hearsay exceptions are
justified on the theory that some other force may provide an
adequate substitute for cross-examination, so one could claim that
the confrontation requirement is satisfied by a sense of imme-
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Not all witnesses relied upon by the prosecution are considered "witnesses against" the accused, however. If a particular person's contribution makes him a principal witness,
then he is a "witness against" and must be confronted
absent excuse or waiver. On the other hand, a declarant
such as the inmate in Evans,61 whose testimony is considered peripherally significant, need not be produced at trial
under the Confrontation Clause.
Once an individual is deemed a "witness against" the
defendant, he is required to testify at trial unless circumstances exist which excuse an absence of cross-examination.
The Court's decisions have limited excusing circumstances
to death,62 permanent absence from the country,6" memory
lapse, 4 and situations in which reasonable effort by the
prosecution has failed to produce the witness.65 A claim of
the privilege against self-incrimination by a witness may
also excuse confrontation at trial, although the Court has
not directly ruled on this contingency."
Finally, the Confrontation Clause limits the type of
hearsay which may be admitted, when a witness against
the accused is unavailable, to previously confronted statements. No Supreme Court decision has approved the use of
an out-of-court statement which produces significant impact against the accused's position unless that statement
has been subjected to cross-examination by the accused

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

diately impending death, the fact that the statement is against
interest, or that it was made in the course of business. These
arguments are, however, patent fictions; none of the factors supposed to give some classes of hearsay a special reliability have
ever been empirically demonstrated to have the effects on accuracy
attributed to them, and some actually have been proved to negate
rather than enhance reliability. Since this justification for the use
of hearsay did not develop until later, it is doubtful that the
drafters of the Sixth Amendment envisaged confrontation being
satisfied by anything other than cross-examination in the presence
of the jury.
Id. at 136.
Dutton v. Evans, supra note 41.
Mattox v. United States, supra note 21, at 243-44.
Mancusi v. Stubbs, supra note 47, at 212.
California v. Green, supra note 37, at 167-68.
Ohio v. Roberts, supra note 54, at 75.
4 D. LoUISELL & C. MUETIR , supra note 19, at 161-62. See also Douglas v.
Alabama, supra note 25, and Bruton v. United States, upra note 32 (unconfronted confessions are inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause
where declarant asserts claim of privilege against self-incrimination).
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either at a preliminary hearing or previous trial." The
Court has refused to allow arguably reliable but unconfronted hearsay merely because the witness was unavailable at trial.6 8
Several scholars regard the confrontation doctrine as

a rule of preference for evidence in the best possible form,"
a view which has been adopted by a number of lower courts.7"
According to this theory, once the state has made a good
faith effort to produce a witness, it has fully satisfied its
obligation under the Sixth Amendment. Any restraint on the
reliability of the hearsay statement of the unavailable witness falls within the aegis of the Due Process Clause.

As indicated above, the Supreme Court cases do not
support this rule. The Court has consistently engaged in a
two-tier analysis in these confrontation decisions. Once a
witness has been shown to be unavailable, the Court has
proceeded to examine the challenged statement to determine

whether it has been subjected to prior cross-examination.
THE CATCH-ALL EXCEPTION

To

THE HEARSAY DOCTRINE

Rule 801 (c) of the Federal and Wyoming Rules of
Evidence defines hearsay71 and Rule 802 bars its admission at trial.72 Thus, an out of court statement which is
classified as hearsay must fall within one of the exceptions
to the hearsay rule it if is to be admitted into evidence.
Rules 803(24) and 804(b) (5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the identical Rules 803(24) and 804(b) (6) of
67. Graham, The Right of Confrontation, supra note 58, at 140 n.195; 4 D.

LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 19, at 154.
68. See Pointer v. Texas, supra note 26, at 407 (preliminary hearing transcript); Bruton v. United States, aupra note 32, at 137 (confession);
Douglas v. Alabama, supra note 25, at 419-20 (confession); California v.
Green, supra note 37, at 168-69 (corroborated statement to police officer).
69. See Western, supra note 58, at 597-601; Baker, supra note 58, at 545;
Graham, The Confrontation Clause, supra note 58, at 195.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 78-102.
71. FED. R. EVID. 801(C) is identical to Wyo. R. Evm. 801(c). See rule quoted
supra note 12. The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1975.
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES

at iv (West 1979). The Wyoming Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1978.
Wyo. R. EVID., Order, In the Matter of Adoption.

72. FED. R. EVID. 802 is identical to WYo. R. Evm. 802. See rule quoted supra
note 12.
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the Wyoming Rules of Evidence,73 are two such exceptions
which have been called the residual or catch-all exceptions
because they provide for the admission of hearsay statements which are not covered by the traditional hearsay exceptions." The Advisory Committee appointed to formulate
the rules of evidence 5 viewed the catch-all provisions as a
means of handling new and unanticipated situations which
demonstrate a trustworthiness equivalent to that of the
specifically stated exceptions. These provisions, it was felt,
would allow for growth and development of the law of
hearsay evidence." Congress anticipated that the residual
rules would be used only rarely, but were necessary for
those situations not covered by the traditional exceptions
in which the evidence was reliable and its admissibility
appropriate."
Circuit Court opinions reveal some confusion as to
whether, because of its trustworthy requirement, evidence
which satisfies Rule 804(b) (5) automatically satisfies the
Confrontation Clause. In United States v. West, the Fourth
Circuit found the grand jury testimony of one Brown, a
subsequently murdered witness for the state, to meet the
requirements of both Rule 804 (b) (5) and the Confrontation
Clause despite the witness's criminal record and an absence
73. FED. R. Evw. 803(24) and 804(b) (5) and Wyo. R. Evm. 803(24) and
804 (b) (6) provide:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule . . . Other
exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial
or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity
to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
Rule 803(24) applies when the witness is available and Rule 804(b) (5)
or 804 (b) (6) when the witness is unavailable.
74. See generally 4 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 19, §§ 472, 491.
75.

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES,

supra note 71, at iv. The committee was appointed by Chief Justice Earl
Warren in March, 1965. Id.
76. Id. at 136.
77. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051, 7066.
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of cross-examination." The court focused exclusively on the
trustworthiness of the testimony. Constant surveillance of
Brown by the Drug Enforcement Administration, tapes of
his conversations with the defendant, and immediate transscription and verification of his statements corroborated his
grand jury testimony. Moreover, the court found that Brown
had an incentive to be honest and accurate in his statements
to avoid further imprisonment. 9
The court noted its obligation under the Confrontation
Clause to make a separate determination as to the reliability
of the grand jury testimony and the ability of the jury to
judge the statement's trustworthiness. The court found that
the circumstances which suffice to meet the requirements of
Rule 804(b) (5) also satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. ° Judge Widener in an eloquent dissent
expressed his belief that the "majority's treatment of the
confrontation clause . . . reduce[d] the constitutional provision to the status of a mere rule of evidence when, in fact,
the clause was intended to regulate the procedure of a criminal trial by compelling the presence of the accuser before
the jury and the defendant".8 ' The important question is
not, according to the dissent, whether the statement is
accurate, but whether there has been adequate confrontation. 2
In United States v. Garner, the Fourth Circuit again
found the declarant's grand jury testimony to possess sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the Constitution and
the rules of evidence. Here, many of the details of the
testimony were corroborated by another witness as well as
by documentary evidence. 4 Justices Stewart and Marshall,
dissenting from a denial of certiorari, 5 expressed grave
doubts about the admissibility of grand jury testimony
under either Rule 804(b) (5) or the Sixth Amendment.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited in text as West].
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1136-38.
Id. at 1139.
Id.
574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited in text as Garner].
Id. at 1144-46.
United States v. Garner, 439 U.S. 936 (1978).
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They reasoned that because grand jury investigations are
not adversary proceedings where the witness is crossexamined and weaknesses in his story exposed, the reliability of such testimony is questionable.8"
The Third Circuit in United States v. Bailey had before
it the admissibility of an unsworn statement made to FBI
agents by one of a pair of bank robbers." The defendant
objected that the notice and trustworthiness requirements
of Rule 804 (b) (5) had not been met.88 The court held that
the notice requirements was satisfied when the proponent
of the evidence was without fault in failing to provide pretrial information and the court granted a continuance.89
On the question of trustworthiness, the court ruled that
a single corroborating piece of circumstantial evidence was
insufficient. The trustworthiness of a statement should be
based on more than corroborating facts. The circumstances
under which the statement was made and the propensity of
the declarant to tell the truth are also important considerations. Since Rule 804(b) (5) is triggered only when there
is a need for the evidence, the court reasoned that it would
make little sense to evaluate admissibility by looking only
to the corroborating evidence.9"
Although the court was not required to reach the constitutional issue, it expressed reservations as to the validity
of the unsworn statements in view of the absence of crossexamination, the questionable reliability of the statement,
and the importance of the statement to Bailey's conviction.9 1
The Eighth Circuit first addressed the issue of the
admissibility of grand jury testimony in United States v.
Carlson.2 Based upon the grand jury testimony of one
Tindall, Carlson was charged with distributing cocaine.
When Tindall refused to testify at trial, apparently due to
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 938.
581 F.2d 341 (3rd Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited in text as Bailey].
Id. at 347-50.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 350-51.
547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter cited in text as Carlson].
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fear of reprisal from Carlson, his prior testimony was admitted into evidence."
The court first considered the trustworthiness requirement of Rule 804(b) (5) and found strong indications of
reliability in Tindall's testimony. He was under oath, had
participated in the underlying transaction, and had never
recanted. The court also found there was substantial need
for this testimony since Tindall was the only individual who
could testify as to this particular transaction. 4
The court found the testimony satisfied the materiality
requirement of the rule since it was relevant to show intent,
knowledge, a common scheme, and absence of mistake or
accident2 The probative requirement was met since there
appeared to be no source other than Tindall for this information.96
Although Carlson received no formal pretrial notice,
the court did not allow this fact to bar admission of the
testimony. The prosecution was excused from this requirement since it was unaware until the evening before trial
that Tindall might not testify. Moreover, Carlson could
have sought a continuance had he needed additional preparation time."
The court did not reach the question whether receiving
grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b) (5) denied Carlson
his constitutional right to confront a witness against him.
Rather, the court determined that Carlson had waived his
confrontation right by his own misconduct in intimidating
Tindall into refusing to testify. 8
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Balano held that the admission of grand
jury testimony into evidence is an impermissible violation
of a defendant's confrontation rights.99 The court adopted
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 1351-53.
Id. at 1354.
Id.
Id. at 1355.
Id.
Id. at 1359-60.
618 F.2d 624, 627 (10th Cir. 1979).
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the dissenting position in United States v. West,' and
declared the Confrontation Clause to be concerned with more
than the basic accuracy of hearsay statements. "[Grand
jury testimony] is the equivalent of an ex parte deposition,
it [is] not redeemed by a court appearance of [the declarant] and it [is] secured through a procedure that has
become the arm of the 'examining magistrate' ,,.o' The

court emphasized the importance that the Supreme Court
has placed on cross-examination as a protector of confrontation values." 2
THE HOPKINSON CASE

In Hopkinson, testimony relating to statements made
by the murder victims to acquaintances and in a prior court
proceeding was challenged by the defendant as inadmissible
hearsay." 3 The State conceded the statements to be hearsay,
but argued they were admissible under one of two exceptions to the hearsay rule, namely Rule 803(3)04 or the
catch-all exception Rule 804(b) (6).15 The trial court ad-

mitted the evidence under Rule 803(3) for the limited
purpose of showing the victims' states of mind just prior to
death.' The Wyoming Supreme Court determined that the
statements were inadmissible as 803(3) exceptions because
the mental states of Vehar and Green were not relevant,
since Hopkinson's defense was not based on suicide or any
other theory which put the victims' mental states in issue. '
The court ruled, however, that it must affirm on the hearsay issue if an adequate basis could be found to support the
trial court's admission.' 8
The court found the challenged statements to be admissible under Rule 804(b) (6), relying upon four federal
100.
101.
102.
103.

United States v. West, supra note 78, at 1138-41.
United States v. Balano, supra note 99, at 627.
Id. at 628.
Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 127-28, 134-35.

105.
106.
107.
108.

hearsay rule . . . [a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of
mind, emotion...."
Hopkinson v. State, aupra note 1, at 128-29.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 130.
Id. (citing Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Wyo. 1979), which held
that "the admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial
court and absent a clear abuse of discretion will not be disturbed").

104. Wyo. R. EvID. 803(3) provides: "The following are not excluded by the
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cases which had construed the identically worded Federal
Rule 804(b) (5)."' The first of these was a civil case,
Furtado v. Bishop, in which an attorney's affidavit was
held admissible under the catch-all exception.11 The court
also relied on the reasoning in three criminal cases, United
States v. Carlson... United States v. West,"' and United
States v. Bailey,"3 all discussed in the preceding section of
this note.
The court then derived a test for determining the admissibility of hearsay under Rule 804(b) (6), based on these
cited cases and the court's reading of the rule:
1) The declarant must be unavailable.
2) The adverse party must either have been given
pretrial notice or a sufficient opportunity to
prepare for and contest the admission of the
hearsay.
3) The truth of the matter asserted must be evidence of a material fact.
4) The hearsay statement must be more probative
than any other evidence which could be procured through reasonable efforts.
5) The statement must be supported by circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; this
may be established either through other corroborating evidence or by considering the motivation and/or behavior pattern of the declarant."4
Although the defendant did not challenge the out-ofcourt statements of Vehar and Green on constitutional
grounds, the court nevertheless incorporated into the test
an additional limitation imposed by the Confrontation
Clauses of both the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Wyoming
Constitution." 5 The court cited California v. Green"6 for
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 130-31.
604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980).
See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 131-32.
Id. at 132.
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the proposition that the values of the Confrontation Clause
and the hearsay rule are not the same. 1" ' The court then
outlined the basic purposes of the Clause as being to afford
the accused the right to cross-examine the witness, to permit the jury to observe the demeanor of the witness, and
to bar convictions based solely on ex parte affidavits.11 The
court cited Mattox v. United States"' and Ohio v. Roberts"20
as authority for admitting the prior statements of witnesses
under "certain limited circumstances... 1 The court found
the limited circumstances to be defined best in Mancusi v.
Stubbs..2 as those circumstances which provide "indicia of
reliability" and which "afford the trier of fact a satisfactory
basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.1 ..3
The court concluded that before hearsay may be admitted under Rule 804(b) (6), the Confrontation Clause
further requires the prosecutor to establish "that there
exists sufficient background information concerning the
circumstances under which the hearsay statement was made
to provide the jury with an adequate basis to evaluate its
veracity.''
Application of Test to Statements by Vehar
The court then applied the six-part test to statements
attributed to Vehar:
1) No dispute existed as to the unavailability of
Mr. Vehar.
2) Although pretrial notice of the specific hearsay
statements was not provided in all cases, the
names of the witnesses and sufficient information as to their likely testimony provided the
defense opportunity to prepare for the introduction of the evidence. The court noted that
the defendant never argued surprise.
116. California v. Green, supra note 37.
117. Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1. at 132.
118. Id. (citing United States v. Balano, supra note 99, Mattox v. United
States, supra note 21, and California v. Green, supra note 37).
119. Mattox v. United States, supra note 21.
120. Ohio v. Roberts, supra note 54.
121. Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 132.
122. Mancusi v. Stubbs, supra note 47.
123. Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 132.
124. Id. at 132-33.
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3) Evidence of threats made by Hopkinson was
found to be material to the State's position that
Hopkinson followed through on his threats.
4) Since Vehar was the only witness to the threats,
the hearsay statements were more probative
than any other evidence of the fact that such
threats were made.
5) The hearsay was corroborated by other evidence
as well as consistent with the behavioral pattern
of Vehar. A complaint filed and signed by
Vehar in a civil suit corroborated some of the
statements. Further, all of the statements attributed to Vehar were consistent and he had
planned to testify under oath at the civil suit
as to the truth of his statements.
6) The prosecution provided extensive background
information which satisfied the requirements
of the Confrontation Clause. The history of
two civil suits in which Vehar and Hopkinson
were adversaries had been detailed with evidence of Vehar's character."'
Application of Test to Statements by Green
The court had no difficulty in finding the transcript
of Green's testimony at the Hysell trial to be properly admitted under its test. The defense had pretrial notice that
the transcript would be offered into evidence. Matters
asserted in the testimony-that Hopkinson planned to falsely
implicate Hysell in a murder and that Hopkinson threatened
Green-were, if true, "quite material and relevant," as well
as probative since "they were admissions made by Hopkinson." ' The court noted that this testimony was trustworthy
since Green was under oath at the time it was made, it was
corroborated by other evidence, and his behavior confirmed
the truth of his testimony. Finally, as required by component six, the confrontation element of the test, the jury
was provided information as to Green's character, his behavior at the time he testified, and his relationship with
Hopkinson "to adequately weigh the credence to be given
the testimony.""1 7
125. Id. at 133-34.
126. Id. at 134.
127. Id.
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Similarly, the testimony of Green's sister as to statements made by Green easily passed the test:
(1) and (2) Green was unavailable and the defense had pretrial notice of his sister's testimony.
(3) Green's assertions to his sister concerning Hopkinson's threats, the Hysell murder
scheme, and Hopkinson's hatred of Vehar
were "relevant and material."
(4) The statements were probative since they
involved Green's knowledge as a participant
or as the sole witness to Hopkinson's threats.
(5) Corroborating evidence as well as Green's
behavioral pattern provided adequate. guarantees of trustworthiness.
(6) The jury received sufficient background information to evaluate Green's story.'28
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE HOPKINSON TEST
Rule 804(b) (6) Segment
The Wyoming Supreme Court perceived the need for a
standard by which to judge the admissibility of hearsay
evidence in criminal cases where the requirements of both
Rule 804(b)(6) and the Confrontation Clause must be
satisfied. The court began to develop a standard by enumerating the specific provisions of Rule 804(b)(6) as the
first four components of its test. These provisions concern
the unavailability of the witness, notice to the defense, and
the materiality and probative value of the evidence. An
examination of the manner in which the court applied these
provisions to the challenged evidence in the case serves to
flesh out the test components and illustrate the weight to
be given each.
Notice Component: It appears that adequate notice -will
be important in the Wyoming courts. However, the court
refrained from applying a rigid pre-trial notice requirement consistent with the letter of the rule and took a more
128. Id. at 135-36.
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flexible approach, favored by the West"19 and Bailey"'
courts. So long as the defendant has time to prepare for
the admission of the evidence, the notice requirement will
be met.
Materiality Component: Consistent with the majority
of federal courts,'' as typified by CarlsonW2 , the Wyoming court did not consider this requirement to be a significant obstacle to the receipt of hearsay. Presumably the
court will make an initial determination of relevancy, as it
did when it disallowed the hearsay to show state of mind,
and then not belabor the point in an attempt to show
materiality. The mechanical manner in which the court
applied this component of the test supports this conclusion.
Probative Component: This requirement was also
deemed to be satisfied with no real discussion. Clearly, the
hearsay will be sufficiently probative when the declarant
was the only source of information or a participant in the
underlying transaction.
Trustworthiness Component: The heart of Rule 804
(b) (6) is the trustworthiness requirement incorporated as
the fifth component of the Hopkinson test. A hearsay statement, to be admissible under Rule 804(b) (6), must possess
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The problem
has been in ascertaining what factors guarantee that a statement is trustworthy. The Hopkinson test specifies that either
corroborating evidence, or motivation and/or behavior of
the declarant may be used to establish trustworthiness.
These broad guidelines would appear to be designed to
answer the concern voiced in Bailey.3 that there may be
little or no corroborating
evidence when the hearsay state34
ment is most needed.1
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

United States v. West, supra note 78.
United States v. Bailey, supra note 87.
4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 19, § 491, at 1202.
United States v. Carlson, supra note 92.
United States v. Bailey, iupra note 87.
In cases where corroborating evidence is inadequate, a court would be
forced to exclude the hearsay unless permitted to look to factors such as
incentive of the declarant to tell the truth. The court in United States
v. West, supra note 78, was able to rely on extensive corroborating evidence as well as behavioral/motivational factors to substantiate the reliability of grand jury testimony. Such extensive support is desirable, but
not always available.
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The flexible approach approved by the Hopkinson court
is consistent with that of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Carlson."' In that case the court looked to factors
other than corroborating evidence as indicia of reliability.
The catch-all exceptions to the hearsay rule were enacted as a means of reform-to provide a vehicle for treating new and unanticipated situations. This purpose would
be defeated if the courts imposed excessively stringent requirments on admissibility under these exceptions. Thus,
the Hopkinson court's flexible approach to a determination
of trustworthniess provides room for growth and development of the law of evidence as contemplated by Rules 803
(24) and 804(b) (6).
The rules of evidence, of course, apply to both civil and
criminal cases. However, in criminal trials, the rules must
operate within the confines of the Sixth Amendment and
other constitutional mandates designed to protect the accused.
Confrontation Clause Segment
The final component of Hopkinson test purports to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause requirements of both the
United States and Wyoming Constitutions. When a witness
is unavailable, component six requires the prosecutor to
establish "that there exists sufficient background information concerning the circumstances under which the hearsay
statement was made to provide the jury wtih an adequate
basis to evaluate its veracity."' 6 This requirement of broad
background information does not address the basic purposes
of the Confrontation Clause which are to afford the accused
the right to cross-examine the witness, to permit the jury
to observe the demeanor of the witness, and to bar convictions
based on ex parte affidavits. Although the Hopkinson court
noted these concerns of the confrontation doctrine at the
beginning of its analysis, it failed to adequately pay heed to
them in developing its test.
135. United States v. Carlson, aupra note 92.
136. Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 133.
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The holdings in the United States Supreme Court cases
indicate that a totally unconfronted statement by a principal
witness violates the Confrontation Clause. ."Confrontation"
is the critical aspect of the clause which establishes the
Sixth Amendment as more than merely a constitutionalization of the hearsay doctrine. The Hopkinson test focuses
on the ability of the jury to evaluate the evidence in light
of the surrounding circumstances, but disregards the right
of the accused to have the statement evaluated with the
safeguards of cross-examination and demeanor observation.
Broad background information cannot and should not substitute for the physical presence of a crucial witness.
Although the fundamental aspects of the confrontation
doctrine are neglected, the Hopkinson test does question
(1) whether a witness against the accused made the challenged statement and (2) whether circumstances exist which
excuse an absence of cross examination." 7 Component three
(the materiality requirement), in combination with component four (the probative requirement), arguably deal
with the potential impact of an out-of-court statement to
determine whether a declarant qualifies as a "witness
against" the accused. This interpretation has merit in that
it saves the materiality requirement from being a meaningless reiteration of the relevancy doctrine and also gives
added force to the probative provision. Thus, a statement
which is material, in the sense that it is important to the
State's case, and at the same time is more probative than
any other evidence which could be procured, would tend
to be a strong statement by a principal, as opposed to a
peripheral, witness. The facts of the case support this contention. Both victims related threats made by Hopkinson,
statements which the court found- to be material and probative. This evidence undoubtedly strengthened the State's
case, as the jury would be:inclined to believe that the man
who threatened to kill the victims actually did so. Certainly
Vehar and Green were. "witnesses against" Hopkinson.
137. See 8upra note 59.
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The test is triggered by the unavailability of a declarant to testify at trial, thus assuring that circumstances
exist which excuse an absence of cross-examination. Presumably a witness is unavailable when any of the contingencies specified in Rule 804(a) ' is met. Under the facts
of the case, both Vehar and Green were deceased, obviously
excusing their direct testimony at trial.
Thus, Vehar and Green were unavailable, principal
witnesses whose testimony had considerable impact against
the accused. Their statements which were admitted into
evidence, however, were remarks to acquaintances or testimony from an earlier trial which had never been subjected
to cross-examination by the defendant. Conceding that the
statements were sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted
under the catch-all exception to the hearsay doctrine, their
admission, nevertheless, denied the accused his constitutional right of confrontation.
The Hopkinson court recognized that the Confrontation
Clause is more than a rule of preference for direct testimony. The court's test takes into consideration the unavailability of the witness and the potential impact of his statement against the accused. However, the test succumbs to the
dicta of the most recent Supreme Court decision, in that it
denigrates the explicit rights of the defendant under the
Sixth Amendment in favor of a liberalization of the rules
of evidence deemed to be necessary in "the workaday world
of conducting criminal trials."'3 9
The Confrontation Clause of the Wyoming Constitution
is available, however, as an alternative means of preserving
138.

Wyo. R. EvD. 804(a) provides:
Definition of Unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant: (1) Is exempted by
ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of his statement; or (2)

Persists

in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite an order of the court to do so; or (3) Testifies to
a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(4) Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because
of death or then-existing physical or mental illness or infirmity;

or (5) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his
statement has been unable to procure his attendance by process
or other reasonable means.
139. Ohio v. Roberts, supra note 54, at 66.
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confrontation values. The Wyoming Court has not been reluctant in the past to look to the state constitution as a
means of protecting rights it deems to be fundamental. "
Missouri serves as an example of one state which has held
that unconfronted hearsay is forbidden by the state constitution."'
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court has developed a six-part
test designed to determine the admissibility of hearsay statements in criminal trials under Rule 804(b) (6). The first
portion of the test is, for the most part, a reiteration of
the catch-all evidence rule and is subject to mechanical application. The flexible notice requirement, which focuses on
assuring the defense adequate opportunity to prepare for
hearsay, precludes the stifling of evidence for technical noncompliance with the rule. The most valuable contribution of
this portion of the test is the clarification as to how trustworthiness-the most essential and illusive requirement of
the rule-is to be determined.
The test fails as a tool for the evaluation of hearsay
evidence in criminal cases. While the availability of the
witness and the significance of his statement to the state's
case are properly considered, the test neglects to address
the crucial requirement of the Confrontation Clause---confrontation.
JANE A. VILLEMEZ

140. See Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d
310 (Wyo. 1980); Comment, Wyoming's Equal Protection Clause Mandates
Fiscal Neutrality in School Funding, 16 LAND & WATER L. REv. 691, 699
(1981).
141. State v. Newell, 462 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. 1971).
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